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ABSTRACT
In 2008 and 2015, the world was horrified by the savage scenes of xenophobic 
violence towards black African immigrants in South Africa. It was an unfathom-
able behaviour, given the unprecedented support provided by African countries 
during South Africa’s struggle to end apartheid. This severely dented Africa and 
the world’s view of South Africa as a rainbow nation that is characterised by toler-
ance, forgiveness and reconciliation. Borrowing a phrase from the classic work of 
the famed African-American poet, Langston Hughes, ‘what happens to a dream 
deferred?’ How long do people have to wait for their dreams to be fulfilled? It is 
this ‘oasis of unfulfilled dreams’ that the author of this article utilises to seek for a 
better understanding of the xenophobic violence in post-apartheid South Africa. 
The political freedom gained by the country in 1994 has not translated into eco-
nomic freedom, and despite the end of political apartheid, economic apartheid 
still persists. There have been improvements in the lives of many people since 
the African National Congress (ANC) came to power in 1994, but the majority 
of South Africans continue to experience abject poverty and unemployment. It 
is within this context of hopelessness and disillusionment that the frustrations of 
citizens are projected onto foreigners of African extraction, who are erroneously 
accused of utilising the few resources and jobs, which should be the exclusive 
reserve of the country’s citizens.
African Journal of Public Affairs44
INTRODUCTION
What happens to a dream deferred?
Does it dry up?
Like a raisin in the sun
Or fester like a sore-
And then run?
Does it stink like a rotten meat?
Or crust and sugar over-
Like a syrupy sweet
Maybe it just sags
Like a heavy load
Or does it explode?  
(Langston Hughes cited in Gevisser 2007:11).
Evidently, the theme of the poem is not a simplistic critique of the political establishment 
which existed in the United States of America (USA) at the time. Langston Hughes was 
merely interrogating what happens when a dream is postponed, suspended, shelved, 
tossed aside and not achieved, because of external events beyond the individual’s con-
trol (Gevisser 2007:11). The underlying narrative embodied in the poem resonates very 
well with the paucity of opportunities available to ordinary African–Americans in the 
USA at the time. Therefore, the poem was poignant in a way, as it speaks the truth in 
relation to the power, unjust laws, and lack of electoral, political and economic represen-
tation of African-Americans in institutions of governance in their land of birth (Ukwandu 
2009). The hopes and aspirations of a vast majority of African-Americans were hindered 
by the racist and discriminatory laws and policies of the America of the 1950s. Hughes 
was questioning how long they could delay the fulfillment of their dreams and aspira-
tions before their anger boiled over into outright rebellion (Ukwandu 2009).
In this article, the poem is used as a metaphor to illustrate the fact that the dreams of 
many black South Africans have not been realised in the new South Africa. The prob-
lems of the African-Americans, which were succinctly captured by Langston Hughes 
in his poem, resonate very well with the problems of the average black South African. 
The average black South African is disillusioned by the slow pace of economic trans-
formation in the country and the inability of many citizens to benefit from the rights 
which are enshrined and protected in the new South African Constitution. The eupho-
ria that ushered in the political freedom of 1994 has not been matched by economic 
freedom. As a result, the majority of black South Africans are frustrated and angry 
about the limited job opportunities and unemployment, and they blame immigrants 
for their predicament.
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POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA
It is evident that despite the end of political apartheid in South Africa in 1994, eco-
nomic apartheid persists and haunts the majority of the black population, as millions 
of people are still poor and unemployed in the new South Africa (Hadland & Rantao 
1999:15; Corrigan 1999:25; Mulemfo 2000:35). Hunt and Lascaris (1998:40) are of 
the view that the social, economic and political injustices of decades of segregation, 
colonialism and apartheid had a brutal effect on the mainly black population. The 
experience has left the majority of citizens with scarred memories, and everyone, ir-
respective of colour, race and creed, has dreamed of a better life in South Africa since 
the new democratic order was ushered in (Andreasson 2003:394; Corrigan 1999:25; 
Mulemfo 2000:35). Most of these dreams have not been realised in the new South 
Africa. In this regard, Lundahl and Petersson (2004:232) noted that the South African 
dream is far from being one and the same. This is because all the various groups, 
social classes and cultures in the rainbow nation have their own dreams and aspira-
tions (Hunt & Lascaris 1998:40). However, irrespective of these differences, almost 
everyone shares the vision of a society founded on democratic principles, with equal 
opportunities for all, and in which all citizens can live in harmony (Mulemfo 2000:35; 
Andreasson 2003:394).
One of the reasons identified by commentators and experts on the South African 
economy for the inability of the state to actualise the dreams of its citizens is that 
the neoliberal economic policies implemented by the ANC when it came to power 
in 1994 stymied the hopes of the majority of the black population (Natrass 1996:5; 
Pillay 2000:28). These experts believed that this is one of the principal reasons for 
the high levels of inequality, poverty and unemployment in the country (Lipton & 
Simkins 1993:20; Weeks 1999:798). The policies implemented by the ANC govern-
ment stressed efficiency, stability and incentives which, they argued, are necessary 
for economic growth and to restore investor confidence in the economy (Van Wyk 
2000:16; Bond 2000:42). Critics of these policies are of the view that the ANC’s ac-
celeration of neoliberal economic restructuring after 1994 has become an instrument 
that can be viewed as “predatory liberalism” (Andreasson 2003:394). This phrase was 
used because the policy empowered ANC party elites to hold onto state power, and si-
multaneously marginalised and disempowered those opposed to the economic policy 
of the government (Bond 2000:45; Andreasson 2003:394). The policy has resulted in 
the creation of a small black elite in the form of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) 
beneficiaries, while the majority of the black population continue to suffer poverty 
and unemployment (Van Wyk 2000:16; Bond 2000:42). It is the view of Andreasson 
(2003:394) that ‘predatory liberalism’ comprises a ‘more generic cocktail of market 
capitalism, state authority and oligarch power that will constitute a new defining 
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element of the global order, and South African political elites bought into these illu-
sions hook, line and sinker’ ( Andreasson 2003:394).
It is vital to understand why economic liberalisation and globalisation had a debili-
tating impact on the lives of the poor in post–apartheid South Africa. Boutros-Ghali 
(Cited in Ukwandu 2014) interrogated the pernicious effects of globalisation on de-
veloping countries, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa. His narrative emphasised 
that economic and political fragmentation is one of the secondary effects of the glo-
balisation of trade and industries (Ukwandu 2014). He explained that globalisation is 
failing to reach sufficient people in the developing world, who have undertaken the 
needed reforms, and millions of poor people are therefore excluded from the benefits 
of globalisation (cited in Ukwandu 2014). His view is corroborated by experts and 
policymakers versed in the developmental problems facing the developing world (Nye 
2002:40). They all posited that the absence of a level playing field in the era of glo-
balisation has exposed the developing economies of Africa to the harsh realities of the 
global political economy (Keohane 2002:25; Krasner 2001:21). It is the view of those 
who have researched the baleful effects of this liberalisation of trade and investment 
on the developing world that there are winners and losers in the world economy, and 
that sub-Saharan Africa in general and South Africa in particular are among the losers 
(Ougaard & Higgott 2002:38; Nye 2002:40).
One means of understanding the ways in which the developed world uses globalisa-
tion to impoverish sub-Saharan Africa is through the use of agricultural subsidies for 
their farmers (Oxfam 2005:3). This is because overall farm support or subsidies paid 
to farmers in the developed world have hovered around US$250 billion per year, and 
this has enabled farmers in the developed world to sell their products at less than 47 
or even 50 per cent of their cost of production to the developing parts of the world 
(Oxfam 2005:3). This means that behind the facade of the liberalisation of trade and 
investment are many poor and developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa, who have 
liberalised their economies and industries too quickly and too early. This has had a del-
eterious effect on the lives of their people, including those living in South Africa. Too 
much liberalisation has exacerbated poverty, unemployment, under-employment and 
homelessness among the country’s poor people (Keohane 2002:25; Krasner 2001:21).
There is evidence in the literature that despite the restructuring and liberalisation of the 
South African economy since the demise of apartheid, the poorest 40 per cent of black 
households experienced a decrease in income of 20 per cent during this period, and 
inequality increased exponentially in South Africa (Barrell 2000). This is illustrated by 
the fact that the average disposable income per black person in 2000 was estimated 
to be only 14.9 per cent that of whites (Van Wyk & Der 2001:16). Likewise, in 2006, 
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the official black unemployment rate was 46 per cent, but the real figure is around 60 
per cent, depending on who is doing the counting (UNDP 2006). The consensus in 
South Africa is that the neoliberal policies adopted by several governments since the 
end of apartheid have mostly helped a few educated people and a host of other black 
elites who have political ties to the ruling party, but have done little for the black ma-
jority, who suffer poverty and unemployment (Weeks 1999:798; Barrel 2000). Bond 
(2000:42) articulated his view as follows: “Aside perhaps from …Democratic Alliance 
Party, there was probably no more effective advocates for the interests of rich white 
South Africans in post-apartheid South Africa than the quiet, smooth bureaucrats of 
the World Bank” (Bond 2000:42).
An example of a neoliberal economic policy that accentuated the poverty of the black 
majority and resulted in the huge loss of jobs in all sectors of the economy is the 
“Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme” (GEAR), which was imple-
mented by the ANC-led government after the end of apartheid (Bond 2000:42; Michie 
and Padayachee 1998:628; Weeks 1999:798). This policy, which was formulated in 
June 1996, has the following main goals: ‘the creation of 409 000 jobs annually and 
an inflation rate of below 10 per cent; an average annual non-gold export growth of 
8.4 per cent; a rise in gross domestic savings from 18 per cent to nearly 22 per cent of 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP); an increased gross domestic investment from 20 
per cent to nearly 26 per cent of the GDP in 2000, with an average annual real private 
investment growth rate of 11.7 per cent; an inflow of foreign investment equivalent to 
almost 4 per cent of the GDP; and a reduction of the budget deficit to 3 per cent of 
the GDP’ (Andreasson 2003:39; Michie and Padayachee 1998:629; Weeks, 1999:799; 
Pillay 2000:50). There was a misplaced belief which permeated the top echelons of 
the South African government at that time that this false doctrine and policy would 
help the country transcend its brutal legacy of segregation, colonialism and apartheid 
(Natrass 1996:5).
Many critics of this neo-liberal economic policy found it unfathomable why the rul-
ing ANC did not apply reverse gears when it became self-evident by the early 2000s 
that GEAR had failed to deliver on its projections in all areas except lowered infla-
tion, budget deficit reduction and export targets ( Michie & Padayachee 1998:628; 
Natrass 1996:18). Those with an informed view of the nature and state of the South 
African economy after apartheid are of the opinion that the ANC-led government is 
responsible for the pervasive nature of poverty and unemployment in post-apartheid 
South Africa (Lundahl & Petersson 2004:735; Hunt & Lascaris 1998:48). They based 
their analysis on the fact that the new government, even in the face of valid facts 
and reasons, persisted along the ruinous path of the liberalisation and restructuring of 
the economy, despite evidence that it was impoverishing the majority of the people 
African Journal of Public Affairs48
(Barrell 2000; Bond 2000:42; Andreasson 2003:398; Lundahl & Petersson 2004:735). 
In their view, the government made the following mistakes:
●● It stuck firmly with GEAR despite its failure to meet almost all of its targets 
(most notably the growth of GDP, investment, exports, and the protection of 
the value of the Rand);
●● It engaged in draconian fiscal conservatism and dispensed with social pro-
grammes, thereby harming the poor, while bending over backwards to repay 
apartheid-era debts;
●● It maintained a regressive value-added tax on basic goods, while giving tax 
breaks to the rich;
●● It facilitated capital flight and exchange rate instability through financial market 
liberalisation;
●● It allowed the Reserve Bank to keep interest rates high in order to safeguard 
financial markets, without regard for the effects on employment;
●● It reduced tariffs rapidly, resulting in massive de-industrialisation and job losses; 
and
●● It allowed the widespread lack of service delivery to occur, exacerbated by 
severe cronyism and affirmative action, which has resulted in South Africa 
not putting its best foot forward (Barrell 2000; Bond 2000; Andreasson 2003; 
Lundahl & Petersson 2004; Hunt & Lascaris 1998: Michie & Padayachee 1998; 
Weeks 1999; Natrass 1996).
This is not to say, however, that life in modern South Africa remains the same as it was 
under apartheid. In more than 20 years since the end of apartheid, the ANC has trans-
formed the country in different ways: from being a pariah nation to a beacon of hope 
and inspiration, not only in Africa but throughout the world. In addition, the ruling 
party has built millions of houses for the homeless, as well as schools, hospitals, etc. 
According to Jonny Steinberg (cited in Okeowo 2015:33): “The lives of the bottom 20 
percent have changed since apartheid, and all of these changes have been delivered 
directly by the state” (Okeowo 2015:33).
However, the changes have not gone far enough, and the transformation is incomplete, 
as the great majority of the black population have not benefitted from the gains of 
political freedom. Today, in post-apartheid South Africa, there is so much more that 
needs to be done, as electricity blackouts, corruption, massive youth unemployment, 
poverty and poor governance have had a pernicious effect on the lives of the black 
African majority. The former Secretary General of the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU), which is the largest labour union in the country, Zwelinzima Vavi 
(Okeowo 2015:33), summed up the country’s state of affairs as follows: “South African 
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democracy is under threat from a gang of ‘tenderpreneurs’ who seek to build instant 
wealth using the power they have and the control they hold over the state. These 
will be people who have grown very powerful because of the patronage networks 
they have set up. If we can’t stop this, it seems we will be marching slowly but surely 
toward a building of a kleptocracy” (Okeowo 2015). 
The state and direction of the economy, which characterises the life of the average 
South African, is vividly illustrated by the following data from the South African 
Treasury (2011):
“Only two out of five persons of working age (41 per cent) have a job, compared 
with 65 per cent in Brazil, 71 per cent in China and 55 per cent in India. To match 
the emerging markets average of 56 per cent, South Africa will need to employ 18 
million people–five million more than are employed today. To keep pace with the 
number of people entering the labour market, this would require the economy to 
create 9 million jobs over the next 10 years” (National Treasury 2011).
Since the demise of apartheid, the South African economy, under the guise of glo-
balisation and liberalisation, has opened up in such a way that it was very difficult 
for many infant industries to survive, which had been flourishing under the cocoon of 
apartheid protection during the years of economic sanctions (Bond 2000:43). Today, 
most of the factories have floundered, resulting in deindustrialisation, loss of jobs, and 
increased levels of poverty (Bond 2000:42). The deindustrialisation of South Africa has 
worsened the country’s poverty, inequality and unemployment rates (Mills & Herbst 
2012:55). To illustrate how the South African economy has hemorrhaged jobs in post-
apartheid South Africa, a look at the once industrial town of Dimbaza in the Eastern 
Cape paints a picture of the destruction of jobs in the new and democratic society 
(Mills & Herbst 2012:55). Dimbaza had 120 factories in the 1980s and well into the 
1990s, and the last factory, Dimbaza Foundries, closed shop in 2011, resulting in the 
loss of thousands of jobs (Mills & Herbst 2012:55).
A combination of the corrosive effects of globalisation and lack of government sup-
port for these industries has meant that today, millions of South Africans who believed 
that economic freedom in the form of jobs would accompany political freedom have 
been left hugely disappointed by the new realities of poverty and unemployment. 
There is a palpable fear in post-apartheid South Africa among ordinary and well-
meaning South Africans that their dream of a prosperous and inclusive society may 
be derailed. It may happen like the way the wheels fell off in their closest neighbour, 
Zimbabwe, where a kleptocratic elite under Robert Mugabe and his Zanu-PF allies 
have ruined the prospects of a once prosperous nation. It is within this context of 
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anger, frustration and hopelessness that the author locates the root causes of the 
xenophobic violence in South Africa. Instead of blaming their government for not 
delivering on the promises of 1994, some South Africans blame foreign black African 
immigrants for taking their jobs, resources, women, space and even their houses 
(Dodson & Oelofse, 2014:141: Neocosmos 2006; Harris 2001; Sharp 2008; Reddy 
2012). In this battle for the few resources and jobs available in the country, it be-
comes a battle for survival; the black African immigrant becomes a vulnerable and 
easy target, as well as a scapegoat.
XENOPHOBIA IN POST-APARTHEID 
SOUTH AFRICA (2008 AND 2015)
Xenophobia has been seen as a global phenomenon that is usually manifested in 
a country going through economic and political transitions (Neocosmos 2006; 
Harris 2001). This can be seen in the rise of xenophobic and nationalistic senti-
ments in Europe against immigrants from other countries fleeing war and conflicts 
(Hobsbawm 1996:256). This is widespread because Europe itself is still recover-
ing from economic recession and in this period of struggle for cheap resources; 
the immigrant population are mostly blamed for all sorts of social ills which exist 
in their new country, even though those ills may predate their visit ((Hobsbawm 
1996:256; Dodson & Oelofse 2001). Primarily, xenophobia sentiments germinate 
from the sense that foreigners or immigrants in a country constitute a form of threat 
or danger to the citizens in the country (Harris 2001; Neocosmos 2006; HRSC 
2008:10). It is another form of extreme nationalism but xenophobia is more obvious 
in a country where poverty and unemployment are insidious (Neocosmos 2006; 
Hobsbawn 1996). This is the reason why the ugly head of xenophobia and national-
ism can be noticed in some European countries grappling with economic difficul-
ties (Hobsbawm 1996:256; Harris 2001).
In a narrative that is closely related to the events in South Africa, Neocosmos (2006) 
sees “xenophobia as a problem of post-coloniality, a phenomenon that is related with 
the politics of the ascendant groups in the time following political independence in 
most developing countries”. This incident has to do with a sense of supremacy among 
the ruling groups in a country but most crucially it is an integral part of a ‘scapegoat-
ing’ exercise as enunciated by Harris, (2001), whereby the unfulfilled dreams and as-
pirations of a people in a new democracy becomes rooted in the foreigner or outsider 
personifying poverty, unemployment, under-employment and all aspects of material 
deprivations (Harris 2006; Neocosmos 2006).
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In simple terms, xenophobia is intense dislike, resentment or unease towards foreign-
ers or immigrants (Dodson 2010:5; Dodson & Oelofse 2001). It is encapsulated in 
prejudicial or invidious views and conducts and it usually climaxes in violence and 
even death as was witnessed in South Africa in 2008 and 2015 ( HRSC 2008; Harris 
2006; Neocosmos 2006: Steyn 2014). Such intense hatred and fear of foreigners or im-
migrants could be caused by the fear of citizens that they could be losing their social, 
economic or even political status, or developed as a result of even imagined threats 
that is not grounded in reality as is the case in South Africa (Harris 2001; Mogekwu 
2005; HRSC 2008). As in the case of South Africa, the xenophobes do not have com-
plete knowledge or information about the foreigners or immigrants in their midst which 
they hate and as a result they perceive them as threats to their resources, survival, 
status, jobs etc.( Mogekwu 2005; Steinberg 2008a).
The author is not alone in the narrative that the incidences of xenophobia which oc-
curred in South Africa in 2008 and 2015 were triggered by poverty, unemployment 
and underdevelopment which characterises the life of the majority of ordinary South 
Africans (Hadland 2008:2; Sharp 2008a; Steinberg 2008a). After the 2008 xenophobic 
attacks in which 68 people died (mostly immigrants of African origin) and thousands 
were displaced, this narrative gained ascendancy in national discourse and was ac-
centuated by many commentators in South Africa (Hadland 2008:2; Sharp 2008a; 
Steinberg 2008a). In an editorial of an influential weekly newspaper, the Mail and 
Guardian, they expressed their view like this: “Frustrated by escalating costs of living 
and competition for houses and jobs, poor South Africans, mostly uneducated about 
the role that fellow Africans played in the South African liberation struggle, are picking 
the easiest scapegoats amongst them – foreigners” (cited in Crush 2008:12).
This view was also accentuated by another journalist in May 2008 who blamed the 
ANC for the xenophobic violence (cited in Crush 2008:13). Justice Malala held that 
the inability of the ANC-led government in South Africa to create jobs, alleviate pov-
erty and improve the overall living conditions of the black population in the country, 
has contributed to a sense of disillusionment and frustration among the majority of 
the black population (Crush 2008:13). He cited ‘an increasingly incompetent police 
service, poor service delivery and corruption in public departments’ as combustible 
factors fueling the violence (Crush 2008:19). This anger and frustration of the citi-
zens has boiled over into xenophobic violence against immigrants of mostly African 
origin (Cited in Crush 2008:13). Bearak and Dugger (2008) concurred with the view 
of Justice Malala that opined that the root cause of the xenophobic violence meted 
out to mostly foreigners of African origin could be located at the inability of most 
Africans to reap the dividends of democracy in post-apartheid South Africa (Bearak & 
Dugger 2008). This is because there is widespread poverty, unemployment, housing 
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shortages and a growing gap between the rich and the poor (Sharp 2008a; Steinberg 
2008a; Crush 2008:13). In this state of general disillusionment felt by the majority of 
the population, immigrants of African origin become easy scapegoats to blame for 
the inability of the citizens to reap the dividends of democracy promised them at the 
demise of apartheid.
EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
POVERTy AND XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE
South Africans are quick to accuse foreigners of all kinds of things in order to justify 
the xenophobic attacks and looting of foreign-owned shops and offices. Many claim 
that foreigners are taking jobs from them, while others claim that black African foreign-
ers are taking women from them, and yet others claim that foreigners are bringing 
crime into the country (Dodson and Oelofse 2000:141; Wilkinson 2015;Everett 2011:7; 
Reddy 2012:13). None of these reasons, however, are justifications for the murder and 
violence being perpetrated against fellow Africans, in view of the support that South 
Africans received from other African countries during their struggle against white mi-
nority rule and apartheid. The reasons advanced for the violence are emblematic of 
the deeper frustration and anger experienced by the majority of the black population 
because of their inability to benefit from the fruits of the economic freedom enjoyed 
by only a few people since 1994. There is evidence in the literature that there is a close 
link between poverty, frustration and violence, which often boils over into xenophobic 
violence (Gurr 1970; Davies 1973).
In a Human Sciences Research (HSRC) report published in 2009, which dealt with 
the xenophobic violence of 2008, Pillay (2009:12) explained that the unrest of 2008 
left more than 60 black Africans dead and around 2 000 African immigrants dis-
placed (Pillay 2009:12). It began in the informal settlement of Alexandria and quickly 
spread to other areas of Gauteng, such as Cleveland, Diepsloot, Hillbrow, Tembisa, 
Primrose, Ivory Park and Thokoza, before spreading to other parts of the country 
(Pillay 2009:12). The common denominator in the xenophobic violence of 2008 and 
2015 is the fact that it usually started in very poor areas and in a country with a pov-
erty and unemployment rate of around 50 per cent (Wilkinson 2015).The competition 
for resources and opportunities can generate intense anger and frustration, which ul-
timately leads to violence against foreigners (Pillay 2009:12; Crush 2008, Steyn 2014; 
Wilkinson 2015).
The frustration and anger over the slow pace of service delivery and lack of oppor-
tunities for the majority of the population is evidenced by the high rate of service 
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delivery protests throughout the country (Pillay 2009:12). In a study conducted by 
the University of Johannesburg, it was shown that there has been a sharp increase in 
the number of service delivery protests across the country since 1994 (Grant 2014). 
It moved from 162 protests per year in 2008 and in 2009 it was 314, but the number 
went up to 470 in 2012, which translates into an average of more than one protest a 
day (Grant 2014). Among the grievances of the protesters was the slow pace of service 
delivery in their communities, lack of adequate housing, water and sanitation, poor 
representation in electricity governance, corruption within municipal administration, 
poor roads, unemployment, lack of adequate land, poor health care, and crime (Grant 
2014; Hadland 2008:2; Sharp 2008a; Steinberg 2008a).
Most of what is mentioned in the literature about the link between material depriva-
tion, frustration and violence was greatly influenced by the research undertaken in the 
USA in the 1970s by Gurr (1970) and Davies (1971). In their studies, Gurr and Davies 
explained that in most societies where dreams are left unfulfilled and high expecta-
tions are met with disappointment and disillusionment, the result is a sharp rise in the 
rate of violence and crime. In these cases, citizens usually look for an easy scapegoat 
to blame for their misfortunes in life (Gurr 1970; Davies 1971).
Gurr (1970) used the notion of ‘relative deprivation’ to emphasise that the greater the 
disillusionment experienced by the majority of the population, the more likely they are 
to resort to violence in order to vent their anger and frustration (Gurr 1970). This means 
that once discontent is evident in the population and is politicised by the politicians in 
government, there is an increased likelihood that the vast majority of the population 
will resort to violence to remedy what they perceive to be a denial of their assumed 
rights and privileges.
In the case of South Africa, the politicisation of the myth by some Ministers in gov-
ernment that black foreigners were to blame for their poverty and unemployment 
served as fuel in an already combustible situation (Gurr 1970). In his theory of ‘relative 
deprivation’, Gurr (1970) defined the notion of discontent and disappointment as ‘a 
perceived discrepancy between men’s value expectations and their value capabilities’ 
(Gurr 1970). The notion of ‘value expectations’ is applied in this context to allude to 
‘the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled’, 
and ‘value capabilities’ for ‘the goods and conditions they think they are capable of 
attaining or maintaining, given the social means available to them’ (Gurr 1970).
The occurrence of xenophobic attitudes and violence in 2008 and 2015 was exacer-
bated by the absence of a strong political leadership to curb the negative narratives 
being promoted throughout the country against black African immigrants (Wilkinson 
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2015; Crush 2008; Steinberg 2008a; 2008b).The indecisiveness with which the post-
apartheid government has handled the issue of black African immigrants has amplified 
the problem and led to its re-occurrence in 2015, after the savagery of its first occur-
rence in 2008. This is evident in the speech of the first President of democratic South 
Africa, Nelson Mandela, on the National Day of Safety and Security in 1994: “The fact 
that illegal immigrants are involved in violent criminal activity must not tempt us into 
the dangerous attitude which regards all foreigners with hostility” (Dodson 2010).
This assertion by a near mythical figure in the person of Mandela made the association 
of foreigners with crime a recurring theme in the South African political and economic 
discourse, though there is very little data to support this assumption (Dodson 2010). 
There are researchers who have studied the link between foreigners and crime in 
South Africa, and they are of the view that Black African immigrants are mostly victims 
of violent crime in the country, instead of committing the alleged crimes for which 
they are blamed by the population (Danso and McDonald 2001; Harris 2006).
SEPARATING THE MyTHS FROM THE FACTS
One of the many reasons advanced by some South Africans for their anger towards 
black Africans since the xenophobic violence of 2008 and 2015 is that foreigners are 
taking jobs from locals in the country (Sharp 2008a; Harris 2006). The recent xeno-
phobic violence of 2015, much like that of 2008, which engulfed parts of KwaZulu-
Natal and Gauteng, was characterised by such unsubstantiated allegations (Wilkinson 
2015; Reddy 2012:13). Each round of xenophobic violence was usually followed by 
a looting spree of foreign-owned shops, as well as the burning of the houses and 
shops of foreigners. In addition, some of these foreigners, mostly black Africans, were 
stabbed, shot, and even killed (Wilkinson 2015; Dodson 2010).
One of the myths is grounded in a fear of black African immigrants as shown by the first 
Minister of Home Affairs, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, and leader of one of the opposition 
parties in South Africa, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) (Reddy 2012:13). He expressed 
this fear when he explained that the bold initiative of the Mandela administration, 
which was premised on the Reconstruction and Development Plan, would inevitably 
fail if ordinary black South Africans were left to struggle for essential infrastructures, 
such as houses, jobs, health care, education etc. (Reddy 2012:13; Dodson & Oelofse 
2001). He also suggested that giving jobs to foreign migrants was ‘unpatriotic’, and 
that the policy of the Reconstruction and Development Plan, which was initiated by 
the new majority government of Nelson Mandela in 1994, would be put in jeopardy 
by these immigrants (Dodson & Oelofse 2001). He believed that immigrants would be 
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‘absorbing unacceptable proportions of housing subsidies and adding to the difficulties 
we will be experiencing in health care’ (Reddy 2012: 13).
According to Professor Loren Landau, the unsubstantiated assertion that “these foreign-
ers are taking jobs from South Africans is an argument that is always made, as if it justi-
fies killing” (Wilkinson 2015). These erroneous beliefs are not the exclusive preserve of 
the ordinary South African, as there are many politicians in the top echelons of South 
African government who still hold on to this narrative (Crush 2008; Gumede 2015). 
In early 2015, when there were a few incidences of attacks against foreigners in some 
parts of Gauteng, a member of the National Executive of the ANC and the Minister of 
Water and Sanitation, Nomvula Mokonyane, stated on a social media platform that in 
the town of Kagiso: “almost every second outlet (spaza) or even former general dealer 
shops are run by people of Somali or Pakistan origin … I am not xenophobic fellow 
comrades and friends but this is a recipe for disaster” (Wilkinson 2015).
This erroneous belief that foreigners dominate the informal businesses in South Africa 
is prevalent in both official and unofficial views of ordinary South Africans (Everatt 
2011:7). It was shown by the following assertion by a focus group participant in a 
study conducted in Johannesburg in 2008: “Every foreigner who is employed has 
robbed a South African of that job and every foreigner who does not work commits 
crime” (cited in Everatt 2011:7).
This sentiment was echoed when another high-ranking Minister in the government, 
Lindiwe Zulu, who is in charge of Small Business Development, told the media that: 
“Foreigners need to understand that they are here as a courtesy and our priority is to 
the people of this country first and foremost … They cannot barricade themselves in 
and not share their practices with local business owners” (cited in Wilkinson 2015).
The view that foreigners are taking jobs from local South Africans is, for the most part, 
not based on data (Grant 2014; Reddy 2012). Rather, it is based on anecdotal evidence 
which borders on fantasy. There is a big difference between reality and myth, and this 
myth of foreigners taking jobs from South Africans has gone on for so long that many 
take it to be the truth (Wilkinson 2015). In a study undertaken by the Observatory 
Group on the informal economy in Johannesburg, the lead researcher concluded: 
“That the belief that international migrants dominate the informal sector is false. We 
found that less than two out of 10 people who owned a business in the informal sector 
in Johannesburg were cross-border migrants” (Wilkinson 2015).
This above statement refers to immigrants from African countries. The Observatory 
Group also found that black African immigrants play a beneficial role in the country 
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through the payment of taxes, rent, etc. They summarised their findings as follows: 
“The evidence shows that foreigners contribute to South African economy and South 
Africans by providing jobs, paying rent, paying VAT and providing affordable and con-
venient goods” (Wilkinson 2015).
In conclusion, the Observatory Group found that 31 per cent of the 618 black African 
immigrants who were interviewed rented properties such as shops and houses from 
South Africans, and employed 1 223 people, of whom 503 were South Africans 
(Wilkinson 2015).
PLAyING THE OSTRICH: THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN GOVERNMENT
The denialism of the South African government is evident in its determination to label 
the savagery as criminality instead of xenophobia. This has hampered efforts to solve 
the problem. The poor handling of the incidences of xenophobia in South Africa is 
exemplified by the words of the former President, Thabo Mbeki, after the xenophobic 
violence of 2008:
“What happened during those days was not inspired by possessed nationalism, or 
extreme chauvinism, resulting in our communities violently expressing the hitherto 
unknown sentiments of mass and mindless hatred of foreigners – xenophobia…. 
I heard it said insistently that my people have turned or become xenophobic… I 
wondered what the accusers knew about my people which I did not know. And 
this I must also say—none in our society has any right to encourage or incite 
xenophobia by trying to explain naked criminal activity by cloaking it in the garb 
of xenophobia” (cited in Dodson 2010).
This Mbeki narrative was repeated during the 2015 xenophobic violence by the 
Minster of Home Affairs, Malusi Gigaba, who claimed that South Africans are not 
xenophobic, but that criminal elements in the country were behind these attacks (Mail 
& Guardian 2015). In a statement issued after the outbreak of xenophobic violence in 
2008, the Council of Anthropology Southern Africa (Sharp 2008a:2) said the follow-
ing: “As anthropologists, we are deeply concerned, both professionally and as citizens, 
that these actions reflect a continuing emphasis in South African political discourse on 
cultural, racial and national differences. It is a discourse that, drawing on a long dis-
carded anthropology, essentialises such differences even as it claims to celebrate them. 
It is a discourse that was central to colonialism, slavery, segregation and apartheid. It 
is a discourse that perversely persists to the present, now manifesting in the way the 
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media labels as “xenophobia” horrendously violent acts where some South Africans 
raise fists, swing axes and pangas, and use matches to light fires as means to attack 
their fellows who happen to speak different languages and allegedly look somewhat 
different from themselves” (cited in Sharp 2008a: 2).
Embedded in the narrative of the government and some segments of the South 
African population in denying the fact that the savagery and barbarism against the 
black African population is xenophobia is the fact that the idea of a rainbow nation, 
which is the unofficial symbol of Mbeki’s dream of African Renaissance, will be shat-
tered (Sharp 2008a:2).The government refuses to acknowledge these behaviours as 
xenophobia, because this will highlight the inability of the government to improve the 
living conditions of its people (Mail & Guardian 2015). This can be seen in the wide-
spread service delivery protests which have engulfed the country since democracy 
(Grant 2014). There is no evidence to prove that foreigners are taking jobs from South 
Africans or that foreigners are the sole perpetrators of crime in the country (Reddy 
2012:13). These myths simply represent the practice of blaming other migrants from 
African countries for the government’s inability to improve material conditions more 
than 20 years after the end of apartheid (Grant 2014; Reddy 2012: 13; Dodson 2010). 
Second, it is clear from the views of Gurr (1970) that it is the frustration and anger of 
the wider population that causes them to look for scapegoats, which in this case hap-
pens to be black African immigrants.
CONCLUSIONS
‘What happens to a dream deferred?’ The former South African President, Thabo 
Mbeki, asked this question in Parliament in 1998, paraphrasing Langston Hughes 
(1974), in order to introduce a debate on reconciliation and nation-building, and his 
answer was: ‘It explodes’ (Mbeki 1998). Mbeki turned a question into a prophecy, in 
order to shock his complacent countrymen into action, so that the dreams of black 
South Africans which had remained unaddressed in democratic South Africa could 
be fulfilled (Mbeki 1998). Mbeki emphasised that the members of the ruling ANC 
are faced with the danger of a mounting rage to which we urgently need to respond 
(Ukwandu 2009). Mbeki stated the following:
“we will have to answer the question honestly as to whether we are making the 
requisite progress: To create a non-racial society;
to build a non-sexist country;
to heal the divisions of the past;
to achieve the peaceful coexistence of all our people;
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to create development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, 
race, class, belief or sex; and
to improve the quality of life of all citizens” (Mbeki 1998).
Thabo Mbeki’s concern, when he paraphrased Hughes, was the crisis of black South 
Africans awaiting economic liberation from economic apartheid, and who now found 
themselves often with even less than they had before and therefore on the brink of a 
dangerous explosion (Gevisser 2007). A significant number of black South Africans 
are exasperated by the fact that economic liberation has not followed political libera-
tion, as economic apartheid is still alive and well in the country, given the widespread 
inequality and poverty that still exists more than 20 years after the demise of political 
apartheid. According to Statistics South Africa (Stats SA), 25.5 per cent of the popula-
tion is unemployed (Steyn 2014).
Mbeki (1998) has repeatedly stated, in one way or the other during his presidency, that 
he is haunted by the nightmare of a seething majority that will boil over into rebellion, 
because its dream of liberation has been deferred rather than redeemed. The crisis 
of expectation facing the average black South African is better encapsulated in the 
brilliant poem of Hughes (1974), which highlights the danger of the pent-up anger and 
frustration of a population who cannot contribute their quota, having been disempow-
ered through their exclusion from state resources.
The author of this article is of the view that, as shown previously, it is the paucity of 
opportunities in the new South Africa that is the root cause of the xenophobic violence 
against foreign black African immigrants. The causes of the violence are economic, 
and the reason why the government is playing the ostrich and refusing to confront 
the problem of xenophobia is that this would expose the illusion of South African 
exceptionalism. Facing the reality of the unfulfilled dreams in post-apartheid South 
Africa will also make the average voter realise that corruption and poor governance 
have stymied the efforts of the ANC-led government in delivering on its promise of 
economic freedom following political freedom.
The government is continuing to promote the myths of black African immigrants being 
the source of crime in the country and of reducing the opportunities available to South 
African citizens. They are paddling this erroneous belief because in this way, they are 
able to avoid the pertinent question that should be asked as to why the government 
has not delivered on its promises of 1994. These promises are that of establishing a 
non-racial, egalitarian and inclusive society where each and every citizen will enjoy 
the benefits of the new freedom. This narrative of shifting responsibility to the foreign-
ers is convenient for the authorities, because if the citizens come to realise that the 
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ruling party has been engulfed by inefficiency and corruption, it could bring about an 
Arab Spring kind of revolution in the country.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Since the main cause of the xenophobic violence in South Africa is that there are few 
opportunities for the average South African, the government should make a concerted 
effort to transform the economy, so that more people will benefit from the fruits of 
political freedom. Lack of adequate transformation will inevitably lead to another wave 
of xenophobic attacks in the future. It is important to note here that in 2008 and 2015, 
the years in which xenophobic attacks spread like wildfire throughout the country, the 
local economy was in the doldrums (Gumede 2015; Wilkinson 2015).
This means that, as Gurr (1970) and Davies (1973) explained earlier in this article, 
periods of economic stagnation and lack of opportunities lead to frustration, anger 
and violence among members of the population. It is unfortunate that politicians have 
politicised the issue of immigration, for fear of being held accountable by the elector-
ate. The root cause of the xenophobic violence must be dealt with, and this should 
entail restructuring the economy to include the poor and those with limited skills 
and education.
The government should also undertake further restructuring of the labour laws of the 
country, as rigid labour laws and the militant and uncompromising labour unions 
which are allied with the ruling party have made the hiring and firing of workers 
very cumbersome.
One of the ways in which the government can tackle the problem of xenophobia is to 
stop playing the ostrich and denying that the attacks against black Africans in 2008 and 
2015 were indeed xenophobic attacks. It was this ambivalence and indecisiveness on 
the part of government that slowed the speed of response, which was urgently needed 
to curb the spread of the violence in certain parts of the country.
News of the inefficiencies and corruption which have characterised public service and 
Parliament has eroded the confidence of the population in the ability and commitment 
of the government to solve their problems. The government should make a concerted 
effort to reduce corruption, and to improve the functioning and delivery of services to 
the municipalities, which have been on the receiving end of daily protests by citizens. 
This will reassure the population that government is on their side, and is willing to and 
capable of solving their problems.
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In addition, the government should give priority to prosecuting those found to be in-
volved in the looting of shops and killing of foreigners in the country, as this will send 
a clear message to the population that no type of criminal behaviour will be tolerated. 
The government should also embark on a mobilisation campaign to sensitise South 
Africans to the contributions and sacrifices made by other African countries during the 
dark years of apartheid. This will enable citizens to be more tolerant of their neigh-
bours from other African countries (Gumede 2015).
Lastly, the government should also make an effort to initiate a type of learnership pro-
gramme for those citizens who may be interested in informal business, as this will help 
them to start their own business, instead of fearing competition from foreign-owned 
businesses and then resorting to violence to put them out of business.
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